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1. Introduction
As well as his better-known contributions to philosophy in areas like metaphysics, philosophy of 
language, and philosophy of mind, David Lewis says a lot about ethical questions across a range 
of papers. (Many of them are collected in Lewis 2000.) While individual papers of Lewis's on 
ethical and metaethical matters have been influential, few philosophers seem to have been 
influenced by these views as a whole: I know of nobody who describes themselves as a Lewisian
in ethics, for example (and if anyone does, they have not said so anywhere Google can find 
them).
Lewis did not aim to give a systematic moral theory. Nor did he seem to end up with a 
systematic moral theory by accident, unlike some of the systematic philosophical theorising he 
ended up doing elsewhere (See Lewis 1983 ix–xi). Still, if we should not hope for a complete 
moral theory from him, threads of thinking through different contributions can be brought 
together fruitfully. In this paper, I want to focus most on the interplay between Lewis's theories 
of rationality and the metaphysics of morals, on the one hand, and his ethical views, on the other.
The first core tension I want to explore is this. Lewis is explicitly anti-consequentialist: 
"consequentialism is all wrong as everyday ethics" (Lewis 1984 p 214). On the other hand, his 
theory of rational action is a fairly standard causal decision theory, according to which agents are
rational insofar as they maximise expected value. (His preferred variety of causal decision theory
is spelled out in Lewis 1981.) It is easy to see how a Lewisian rational agent could behave in line
with consequentialist ideals: she would just have to maximise the right sorts of values. But it is 
harder to see how a Lewisian rational agent could non-accidentally be doing the right thing if the
right thing involves a range of constraints other than promoting the right values. 
The question of whether Lewis's style of meta-ethical approach can be squared with non-
consequentialist first-order views has received much less attention, but I think it is also 
important. Lewis's meta-ethical position was, in his own words, "subjectivism with bells and 
whistles" (Lewis 1993 p 105 ftnt 6): in broad outlines, what a person correctly claims is good 
and right is a matter of that person's attitudes. One advantage meta-ethical subjectivism is often 
thought to have is that it has a more straightforward story about moral motivation than many 
rivals: what someone correctly judges to be right has an internal connection to their motives to 
act. But the natural story for subjectivists to tell about moral motivation works best to explain a 
tie between moral motivation and moral value: explaining motivations to conform to moral 
constraints that are not a matter of pursuing values is not yet explained by explaining the 
motivation-moral value connection.
These conflicts are interesting for much more than reasons of intellectual biography. The 
question of how to marry a theory of rational decision making to non-consequentialist moral 
theorising is an important one on the current philosophical landscape, with some arguing that it 
poses a very serious problem for non-consequentialist views (e.g. Jackson and Smith 2006), and 
others more sanguine about non-consequentialist prospects (e.g. Colyvan et al 2010). While 
something like standard decision theory (evidential or causal) is widely subscribed to at least as a
useful model of rational decision, most philosophers do not accept consequentialism in ethics. 
(The PhilPapers survey carried out in 2009 reported that under 24% of their target sample of 
professional philosophers accepted, or leaned towards, consequentialism (Bourget and Chalmers 
2014 p 476).) So many philosophers, however sympathetic or not with Lewis's other views, seem
tempted to the combination of standard decision theory and anti-consequentialist ethics. Several 
subjectivist approaches to metaethics put value at the centre of their metaethical account: a 
simple example would be to say that that what is good is what one desires in ideal circumstances.
Subjectivist accounts of ethics that focus on moral value might also need to be adjusted for an 
anti-consequentialist.
Examining the interaction of the specific ethical and meta-ethical commitments Lewis had seems
to me a fruitful way to start exploring the options both for anti-consequentialists who wish to 
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retain something like standard decision theory, and for a wider class of subjectivist anti-
consequentialists than Lewis's particular theory.
2. Morality and Rationality
Lewis's theory of rational decision making requires rational agents to maximise expected value 
given their beliefs.1 (They should do so by the canons of causal decision theory rather than 
evidential decision theory: but this wrinkle will not make a difference in this context.) 
Presumably it is possible for a moral person to be practically rational: at least, Lewis nowhere 
suggests that you cannot be both a good person and a rational one, and when he discusses what 
the right thing to do is in various situations he talks as if people should weigh their credences and
values attached to outcomes in roughly the usual way. (For example, when he discusses nuclear 
deterrence and the moral and practical questions of what to do should deterrence seem to fail in 
e.g. Lewis 1984 and Lewis 1989b.) 
On the other hand, Lewis rejected consequentialism in ethics. As well as Lewis's claim that 
"consequentialism is all wrong as everyday ethics" (Lewis 1984 p 214), Lewis objects to all 
"universalistic" ethical systems, including utilitarianism but also, from context, any system that 
determines right and wrong in terms of agent-neutral moral values, saying "[a]n ethics of our 
own world is quite universalistic enough. Indeed, I dare say it is already far too universalistic; it 
is a betrayal of our particular affections." (Lewis 1986 p 128). Instead, "[f]or those of us who 
think of morality in terms of virtue and honour, desert and respect and esteem, loyalties and 
affections and solidarity, the other-worldly evils should not seem even momentarily relevant to 
morality. Of course our moral aims are egocentric. And likewise all the more for those who think
of morality in terms of rules, rights and duties; or as obedience to the will of God." (p 127). 
Lewis here rejects consequentialism in favour of something more like virtue ethics, or an ethics 
1 I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the content of a rational agent's desires is that they maximise value, or that
they need to conceive of themselves as choosing higher expected value options over lower ones in choice situations: 
it is rather than their rational activity conforms to descriptions in terms of decision theory in the right sort of way. 
(Exactly what is required for the right sort of conformity is philosophically controversial. Presumably it requires 
more than that a person in fact behaves in the same way a rational person would, or could.)
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that puts at its centre not just facts about virtue but facts about honour, loyalties, solidarity, and 
so on.2
So, on the face of it, Lewis rejected the doctrine that the right thing to do is to maximise the 
good, or even to maximise the expected good. So on the one hand, rational people are always 
acting so as maximise a certain quantity ("value", in one sense of that term). On the other hand, 
moral people do not always act to maximise the good, and presumably this option is not even 
always permissible for moral people. But plausibly one can be clear-headedly and rationally a 
good person. So rational and good people are maximising a quantity in their actions, but that 
quantity is something other than moral value (or some weighted sum of moral values). This is 
not an inconsistent view, but it is on the face of it strange.
Let me try to articulate why I find that combination strange. If we have a conception of 
rationality as maximising a function that is a weighted balance of our various goals, the most 
natural thing to think is that a rational person who is also moral includes moral values among the 
goals being weighted, and gives them a suitably high priority. That is not to say that even an 
ideally moral person would have no other components of the eventual weighting: even a saint is 
allowed to prefer strawberry icecream to chocolate, given other considerations are equal. For all 
we have said so far, different ideally moral people might have very different desires, provided 
they serve ideal moral ends ideally well. (Perhaps the director of a global food relief program 
and an artist producing uplifting and educational art treasures might have different desires about 
how to spend their day, without either being more morally ideal than the other.)
It seems natural, then, given the picture of rationality, to build in morality to the moral-and-
rational agent by building having the agent's overall evaluation of outcomes be largely (but 
perhaps not entirely) a product of the moral evaluations of outcomes. It is easy to see how these 
may mesh together for a consequentialist. A maximising act consequentialist (who thinks only 
the best, or equal-best, option for action in any situation is morally permissible) can say the 
ideally-moral-cum-rational person has "utilities" that rank the morally most valuable option as 
2 One interpretative note so as not to mislead: in speaking of "egocentric" values, Lewis does not just intend "self-
centred" values in the usual sense. Concern for my family or my country or my planet and its inhabitants would all 
count as "egocentric" in the broad sense Lewis intends here.
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their most valuable option, when there is a unique moral best, and when there are several moral 
options tied for most valuable, their "utilities" rank some or all of those options as the highest. 
Other consequentialist approaches might vary the link between moral value and the utilities of 
the ideally moral person in minor ways: some satisficing consequentialists may wish to say that 
even ideally moral people sometimes rate a morally sub-optimal option as having the most 
utility, provided it is morally good enough, for example. And any theorist may wish to loosen the
restrictions a little when we are dealing with a moral-and-rational agent who is less than ideally 
moral, or less than ideally rational, even if that agent is very moral and very rational.
This way of meshing moral value and the utilities of a rational agent does not look available to 
the anti-consequentialist. According to a committed anti-consequentialist, for example, 
sometimes the option that brings about the most moral value is forbidden. Moral values may not 
be entirely orthogonal to the agent's utility function, but whatever the connection is, the agent 
must, if she is to be moral, sometimes assign more utility to options that are valued sub-optimally
by the appropriate aggregation of moral values. Indeed, to take Lewis's anti-consequentialist 
remarks at face value, he seems to be suggesting that production of moral valuable outcomes has 
relatively little to do with the rational motivations of a moral person. Instead the moral and 
rational person would act in ways that express virtue, display honour and friendship, etc., even 
when this came at the cost of the most morally valuable outcomes. This seems to pull the agent's 
utilities a long way from the moral values of outcomes. So the two ways of thinking about agents
are hard to put back together again: rational action is a matter of choosing from what is evaluated
as the best, but a moral and rational person is largely insensitive to what is morally best, and may
even be (morally) required to act against what is morally best. It seems the moral and rational 
agent must evaluate outcomes using moral criteria, but largely not by using the moral values, 
which seem to be the moral criteria best suited for evaluating outcomes.
When Lewis says, for example, that consequentialism is "all wrong as everyday ethics" (Lewis 
1994 p 214) Lewis appears committed to the view that consequentialism is often incorrect in its 
verdicts about what to do, rather than just incomplete or incorrect in its claims about which 
moral truths are explained by which. He never explicitly claims that we are sometimes forbidden 
from doing what maximises value, to my knowledge, but one place he comes close is in 
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discussing an argument that we ought to beg, borrow or steal as much as we can to donate to 
alleviating poverty in the third world, and indeed that we must devote all of our resources 
beyond a small amount for our own subsistence to that cause (Lewis 1996b). The context is a 
discussion of what Unger 1995 seems to be committed to in his discussion of what is meant to 
follow from "our ordinary morality". Lewis thinks this extreme consequence does not follow 
from our own moral commitments, but he does indicate that it may follow from a "contentious 
system of utilitarian ethics", in what is presumably a reference to Peter Singer's views, among 
others. Lewis appears to endorse the view that we may, permissibly, do less good than the most 
we can do when that good would be for people suitably "separated" from us (pp 157–158) since 
he suggests the permissibility of not making great sacrifices for distant strangers is not just part 
of our "ordinary morality", but is a "legitimate" part of our ordinary morality. And he seems to 
suggest that stealing and other "unscrupulous" behaviour would not be right even if it maximised
the good we could do for those in dire need, at least when those needy are suitably separated 
from us. I would guess that e.g. stealing so much from one's friends and family that they ended 
up homeless and destitute, just in order to get some additional money to an effective charity, 
would be something Lewis would condemn as morally wrong even if the good done for the 
charity recipients outweighed the harm done by the betrayal and poverty inflicted.
One option for resolving this tension, as suggested above, is to hold that one cannot be both 
entirely moral and entirely rational at the same time. If that is the way out, we need not 
understand the moral person as maximising value, of any sort, since that cognitive economy is 
only required for rational agents. The position that morality and practical rationality are in 
tension is not a prima facie absurd one, despite the fact that many contemporary philosophers see
moral requirements as a subset of broadly rational requirements. Kierkegaard argued that 
religious faith and rationality were in tension, and a similar line of thinking might suggest that a 
sufficiently whole-hearted embrace of the moral law sweeps us away from our other 
commitments, even commitments to rationality. Or we might fear, with Sidgwick, that practical 
rationality counsels a self-interest that can conflict with moral requirements (Sidgwick 1907 pp 
496–509). Nevertheless, I will not pursue this option for understanding the apparent tension 
between Lewis's theory of rational action and his theory of moral action, and I will assume that 
being moral is normally consistent with being entirely practically rational. Exegetically, I see no 
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evidence that Lewis saw an automatic tension between being practically rational and being 
moral; and the approach he takes in discussing moral matters suggests to me a picture of agents 
deliberating about how to achieve appropriate ends, and what they might best to do accomplish 
them.
Another way out, that Lewis may well have taken seriously, is that it is just impossible to be an 
altogether moral person in most realistic situations we find ourselves in. If so, a fortiori it would 
be impossible to be both entirely moral and entirely rational in such circumstances. Lewis took 
seriously the thought that there were genuine moral dilemmas with no overall right thing to do. 
Indeed, he went further, arguing that there may well be "dilemmas of virtue", where a decision 
situation may yield conflicting demands on action arising from a single virtue (Lewis 1998b). 
Lewis also seemed sympathetic to incommensurability of moral considerations, including 
questions of what to do (see Lewis 1984 p 207 for incommensurability in assessment of 
character.) He thought that even an omnipotent being would face dilemmas of value that would 
not give it a way to be perfectly good in its responses (Lewis 1993 p 103). It would be no 
surprise if a perfectly rational agent could not be entirely moral in realistic situations, if nobody 
could, in principle, be entirely moral in realistic situations. (That is, they could not be entirely 
moral because there is nothing they could do that did not violate a moral obligation, or nothing 
they could do could be entirely moral because it was indeterminate what counted as doing the 
right thing.)
While important in Lewis's ethical thinking, my suspicion is that we can put aside these 
dilemmas and incommensurabilities for current purposes. So I will primarily focus on cases 
where Lewis holds that there is a right course of action, and there is a unique and determinate 
ranking of the moral value, impersonal and personal, of the options an agent faces. Such cases 
might be artificially simple compared to many of the complex moral problems we face, but it 
will make for a more tractable discussion of the apparent clash between Lewis's anti-
consequentialism and his decision theory. What we learn from these simpler cases can then be 
carried over, with suitable adjustments, to more complex ones. (Omnipotent beings cannot avoid 
these clashes of values, but I take it this reflects an omnipotent being's staggering range of 
7
options rather than it being impossible in general to be faced with a decision where one option is 
best supported by moral considerations.)
3. What Did Lewis Reject When He Rejected Consequentialism?
We have just seen that Lewis appears to reject several parts of the standard consequentialist 
package: he says explicitly that it "[c]onsequentialism is all wrong as everyday ethics", though he
does go on say it is "right as a limiting case", by which I take it he means it gets the right result 
in treating duty and honour as less morally important than the potential destruction of thousands 
or millions of innocent lives (Lewis 1984 p 214). Beyond that, as noted above he condemns any 
"universalistic ethics" as "a betrayal of our particular affections" (Lewis 1986 p 128). (Though 
here I suspect he means to condemn any ethical system that is entirely about e.g. the welfare of 
everyone, rather than a system that contains some universal aspects, while also making room for 
a special status for our personal commitments and relationships.) Finally, as mentioned above at 
one point he appears to deny that maximising moral value is even permissible, when it is a matter
of helping far-away strangers at the cost of cheating, stealing and betrayal (Lewis 1996b p 127–
8).
Let us unpack further what it is about consequentialism that provoked Lewis's rejection of it. 
While Lewis stated his opposition to consequentialism more often than he argued for that 
opposition, he did often say some things that indicated what he disagreed with. Reconstructing 
Lewis's reasoning is unfortunately sometimes speculative given the nature of his remarks, but I 
will nevertheless make the attempt. One crucial thing will be to unpack what Lewis was 
attributing to consequentialist views. "Consequentialism" is a term that is used with varying 
meanings in the literature, and the more we pack into it, the more options Lewis has to disagree 
with it while not having to take issue with things that mesh well with his picture of rational 
decision making. While I do not know exactly what Lewis intended by the expression, let me 
discuss a few doctrines that authors sometimes include as part of the family of views they 
identify as consequentialist.
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The core of consequentialism, as I understand it, is the doctrine that the key commitment of an 
ethical theory is an account of the moral goodness, or moral value, of outcomes. A theory of 
other moral matters such as the rightness and wrongness of actions, or the virtuousness or 
viciousness of character traits, is then to be given derivatively in terms of moral value. A simple 
version of consequentialism is classical Benthamite utilitarianism, where the balance of pleasure 
over pain is the only good; where every person at every time has some amount of utility defined 
in terms of that person's pleasures and pains; every person's utility is as important as any others; 
and that right action consists in acting so as to maximise overall utility: that is, to maximise the 
sum of the utilities of all agents, compared to the sum of utility of all agents resulting from 
alternative actions.
Consequentialists need not adopt the utilitarian account of what moral value is; nor do they need 
to define the total moral value of an outcome by an unweighted sum of the moral goods and evils
accruing to each agent. Outcomes not even involving agents might get some positive or negative 
value, for example, or we might weight agents' values when calculating an overall sum—to 
privilege the worst off, or to privilege the aristocrats, for example. We may wish to use expected 
value in our moral theorising instead of what the value of outcomes will or would in fact be, and 
we may wish to impose much less structure than standard measure theory on comparisons 
between values of outcomes. Some authors (Scheffler 1982 p 1, Pettit 1997 p 129) have wishes 
to insist, in addition, that a consequentialist theory must take moral value to be agent neutral. 
That is, the moral good is the same for all agents. On the other hand, others are willing to count 
"agent relative consequentialism" as a species of consequentialism. This would allow that 
different agents have different moral goods, and different agents appropriately aim to maximise 
(or satisfice) the good associated with that agent. (For a recent overview, see Hammerton 2020.)
I use the terms in such a way that so-called "agent relative consequentialism" counts as genuinely
consequentialist, and I take it that its theoretical similarities to agent-neutral consequentialism 
justifies discussing the two together in many discussions of consequentialism. I am also inclined 
to think that whether we use the label "consequentialism" broadly enough to cover agent-relative 
consequentialism is primarily a terminological matter, and beyond considerations of taxonomic 
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usefulness there is not a further deep question about whether agent relative consequentialist 
proposals are "really" consequentialist or not.
This terminological issue is worth flagging here, however, since it is not clear to me whether 
Lewis was using the expression "consequentialism" broadly enough to cover agent-relative 
consequentialism. If he was thinking that consequentialism was by definition agent neutral, and 
his intuitions were agent relative, that might be a partial explanation of his rejection of 
"consequentialism", as he understood it. Some evidence that he may have taken 
"consequentialism" in his sense to require agent neutrality of moral value will be discussed in 
section 6.
Simple forms of consequentialism offer a unified account of moral value. But it is also possible 
to be a consequentialist and a pluralist about moral values, as e.g. G.E. Moore was. Relatively 
uncomplicated forms of pluralism do not change the overall picture much: when several goods 
are entirely commensurable, we can calculate an overall utility for each and give a final score to 
each outcome. Things get trickier, though, when different values are incommensurable, as Lewis 
thought they could be. Perhaps the most explicit statement of this is in Lewis 1993, where he 
states his "own conviction that values are diverse and incommensurable and in conflict in ways 
that even God could not pursue some without betraying others" (p 103). 
Lewis at least endorsed the agent-relativity of some moral values; he was a pluralist about moral 
value; and as mentioned in section 2 he thought there was a good deal of incommensurability and
even dilemmas between moral considerations. He appears to have thought that approaching 
morality as a matter of maximising value was wrong-headed, and that it was not always 
permissible to maximise moral value, though we may eventually need to explain away those 
appearances, as I will discuss in section 6. For now, then, let me turn to one way someone who 
accepts typical credence-and-utilities decision theory might try to accommodate moral 
considerations and constraints that do not flow from moral values and attitudes to moral values.
4. Maximising Quantities and a Euthyphro Question
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The mere fact that an agent can be represented, in her actions so far as they are rational, as 
maximising a quantity given their beliefs, is not enough to show that the underlying explanation 
of those actions, or the rationality of those actions, is a matter of maximising a quantity given the
agent's beliefs. In principle, a vast array of dispositions to act can be associated with a function 
maximising a quantity, and there need be no interesting link between that representation and the 
actual psychological life of the person exhibiting that behaviour. Indeed, a very wide range of 
patterns of obligation, permission and forbidding can be modelled as requiring an agent to 
maximise a defined-up quantity in the agent's action (Oddie and Milne 1991). That does not 
make every moral theory consequentialism in disguise, albeit with arbitrarily alien-looking 
conceptions of value, nor does it make almost every theory of rational permission into a desire-
satisfaction one, albeit with arbitrarily alien-looking contents of desire.  
The philosophical picture behind Lewis's theory of rational decision is more than that rational 
agents can be represented so that their actions correspond to certain relationships between their 
credences and utilities. Lewis endorsed a broadly Humean picture of motivation, according to 
which the degrees of belief and utilities associated with an agent's beliefs and desires play a 
central role in the psychological explanation of the agent's actions insofar as she counts as an 
agent at all. Still, there is room even for Lewis to draw a distinction between an agent 
maximising expected consequences, and the explanation of the agent's action being in terms of 
maximising that quantity. In particular, a Lewisian rational agent can act to maximise a given 
quantity because of what she ought to do, rather than something being what she ought to do 
because of the structure of her actual or idealised credence and utility functions. Or so I will 
argue. The general idea will be that an anti-consequentialist can see the moral agent as 
recognising obligations or recommendations of virtue, and because of recognising those facts, 
come to have desires and utilities she would otherwise lack, that in turn go together with the 
agent's beliefs to both cause and rationalise action.
To warm us up, consider an ideally rational Lewisian agent following orders. The Captain orders
Agent to climb the hill and plant a flag. Agent desires to follow orders, and believes with very 
high credence that her orders are to climb the hill and plant a flag, on the basis of hearing 
Captain. So, maximising expected desire satisfaction (given the absence of other strong desires), 
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Agent tramps to the top of the hill and sets up the flag. Even though the agent maximised an 
expected value in her action, the order and her obligation is not downstream of her utility 
function in explaining why she acted as she did. Rather, she had the relevant pair of utility and 
credence functions that led to her action because of the order and the accompanying obligation. 
(My own view is that we can model this agent either as changing her credence and utility 
functions after the order, or only her credence function after the order. But either way we do it, it 
should be clear that the order and obligation are not downstream of her credences plus utilities.)
An anti-consequentialist, who rejects an account of moral obligation as being determined by 
moral value of outcomes, could tell a structurally similar story about how an agent acts on a 
moral obligation. Agent hears Duty, "stern daughter of the voice of God", tell her that she has a 
moral obligation to donate $100 to charity. Agent wants to follow the dictates of duty, and 
believes with high degree of belief the dictate is to donate $100 to charity. Acting on her updated
credence-utility pair, Agent donates $100 to charity. Agent's action is proximally explained by 
the interaction of her credences and utilities, but her being obliged to donate $100 is not 
explained by those functions, and perhaps not explained by any value function. Still, the 
obligation can play a role in explaining why she donated the $100 to charity: she has the 
credence and utility functions she has partly because of the obligation, and in this case we can 
trace the explanation of the action back to duty's orders.
This initial sketch is crude in several ways. I gather deontological constraints are not, in fact, 
whispered into deontologists' minds by personified Duty. More seriously, perhaps we are not 
supposed to become aware of our duties by changing our credences first. Nor, perhaps, are our 
moral motivations supposed to be summed up by a general desire to carry out our duties, 
whatever they are. Even if we tinker with these features of the initial sketch, we can still end up 
with a story where duties explain credences and/or utilities, in ways that thereby explain the 
actions of a moral and rational person, rather than duties being explained by value facts, whether 
facts about the agent's own utilities or some more objective facts about moral value. (I will resist 
the temptation to sketch several ways we might put some flesh on these bones.)
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Provided we had some story about how a good person came to opinions about duty, virtues and 
the rest; and we had some story about how those beliefs interacted with her motivational set, 
either in terms of de dicto desires to do the right thing or in some more indirect way that did not 
go via her utilities already being aligned with moral values of outcomes; then we would have the 
material to explain the connection between a moral agent's rational systems and the moral truth, 
or at least what she takes the moral truth to be. (We may wish to add a story about how her 
evidence appropriately bears on her moral beliefs; or some constitution of obligations and virtues
for her out of her attitudes; or to otherwise explain why her moral beliefs and the moral truth can 
do better than align merely by chance.) She will be acting, insofar as she is rational, to maximise 
a quantity, but that quantity may have little to do with what is morally valuable: in the same way 
that our soldier planting a flag on the hill does in the case above not do so because she 
antecedently valued flags on hills, but because she rationally follows orders. We may even want 
to account for moral values themselves in terms of what well informed moral agents bring about,
should we choose to: the direction of dependence between moral value and e.g. obligation would
still be different from the consequentialist's preferred explanation of right action in terms of 
moral value.
An additional wrinkle in making sense of Lewis's view is that he does think consequences play 
some role: and indeed when the stakes are high enough, consequences trump other 
considerations. (Lewis 1994 p 214) This must mean that there is some way for consequences to 
interact with other moral considerations, so that those other considerations can make more of a 
difference in some cases than the balance of consequences, but the non-consequentialist drivers 
of action can be somehow outweighed in the good agent when the stakes are high enough. The 
most natural way to model this would be to assign all the different considerations weights and do
an expected utility calculation: if we started off thinking the "consequences" were a matter of 
life, liberty and happiness, for example, we could add a range of agent-relative weights for the 
agent not breaking promises, the agent doing her duty, the agent behaving virtuously herself etc. 
Assigned the right weights, when the life-liberty-happiness stakes are low, the agent focuses on 
avoiding breaking promises, doing her duty etc., while when the life-liberty-pursuit stakes get 
high, the agent lies, cheats and kills for the greater good. If a Lewisian proceeded this way, they 
would need to show how to understand this formalism without covertly treating duty-doing, 
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promise-keeping, virtue-expressing etc. as fundamentally matters of moral value after all. 
Presumably this could be approached in the same way as above, treating the utilities assigned to 
these matters explained by obligations and virtues, rather than explaining either in terms of 
values.3 
5. A Second Route to Consequentialism for Lewis
As far as maintaining the combination of causal decision theory and non-consequentialist ethics, 
the options sketched in the previous two sections may be sufficient. However, there is one more 
feature of Lewis's overall account that may commit him to consequentialism, and here I think the
prospects for avoiding an ultimate embrace of consequentialist ethics are less rosy than the 
prospects of resolving the tension we have been looking at so far.
As mentioned above, Lewis was willing to describe his own account of moral as "subjectivism 
with bells and whistles" (Lewis 1993 p 105 ftnt 6). The main place where Lewis explores this 
view is in an account of value he provides in Lewis 1989a. This paper is about what values are in
general, though as I read it Lewis thinks of moral values as a subset of the values he discusses. 
(He treats "to be a value" as amounting to "to be good, near enough" when discussing the 
connection between his view and the subjectivism about moral value targeted by G.E. Moore on 
p 71. I take it the "near enough" is because he wants to include values we may not think of as 
moral values in his account.)
On Lewis's account, to be a value is to be "something of the appropriate category... [such that] 
we would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value it" (p 68), where valuing A is a matter of 
desiring to desire A (p 71), and the ideal conditions are certain idealised conditions of 
imaginative acquaintance (pp 79–83). Who "we" are may depend on how widely these 
dispositions, under ideal conditions, to desire to desire are shared: in the limit case, someone 
talking of what is valuable may only be speaking for himself. Lewis says that one of the 
3 There are other ways of attempting to let consequences trump when the stakes are high, but have consequences 
trumped in ordinary stakes cases: there are various proposals for treating non-consequentialist considerations as 
"side constraints" on the pursuit of moral value. If these side constraints cut out at some value threshold, various 
strange results follow: see Alexander 2000. If they do not, however, things seem even less satisfactory: see Nolan 
2009.
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advantages of this view is that it is "naturalistic", both in the senses that it is (more-or-less) a 
kind of analytic naturalism, defining the moral in non-moral terms, and in that it "fits into a 
naturalistic metaphysics. It invokes only such entities and distinctions as we need to believe in 
anyway, and needs nothing extra before it delivers the values". (p 68) The strong suggestion is 
that Lewis would like to find a naturalistic account of the truth in ethics in general. (Not to 
mention Lewis's more general commitment to materialism and naturalism: see Nolan 2005 
chapter 2.)
One of the reasons to adopt this sort of account of moral value is that it provides an easily 
intelligible link between moral value and moral motivation. It is a widespread thought that moral 
value should somehow be practical: at least in typical cases, we are motivated to pursue the 
moral good (though of course that motivation may be less strong than others; and we may make 
moral mistakes or otherwise screw up). If what is morally valuable for us is what we desire to 
desire, then even if we do not desire the good, we at least want ourselves to: and when our 
desires line up with our desires to desire, we will be motivated to pursue what is morally 
valuable for us. (Since Lewis does not hold that desiring to desire is enough for valuing 
correctly, but requires desiring to desire as we would be disposed to do were we ideally 
acquainted with the putative value, the connection he offers between what is valuable and what 
we desire is even more indirect.) Still, in circumstances relatively like the ideal, at least people 
with a certain kind of coherence in their desires will be disposed to pursue morally valuable 
outcomes.
There is a limitation for this line of thought, however, for a Lewisian subjectivist who rejects 
consequentialism. Someone whose desires line up with what they desire to desire (when they 
manifest the disposition to desire to desire that they would have in ideal situations of 
acquaintance) will be someone who desires what is morally valuable for them. And so, given that
desires are motivations, they will be motivated to pursue the moral good (or their moral good at 
least, given the background subjectivism). Non-consequentialists, however, typically hold that 
there are moral requirements other than pursuing the moral good, and which may even forbid 
choosing more moral good over less in some circumstances. The problem is to give an account 
of the motivational force of these non-consequentialist requirements, against the background of 
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Lewis's brand of subjectivism. Why wouldn't the good, practically coherent person, who desires 
what she desires (etc.), just ignore those requirements when it gets in the way of pursuing moral 
value? That is what they want to want to do, when in suitably ideal conditions.
Lewis has several options open to him to resolve this problem. He could endorse the conclusion 
that his story about moral value has nothing to say about the motivation of non-consequentialist 
requirements, and even decline to put anything in their place: after all, something being the 
morally right thing to do is one issue, and whether any of us are non-accidentally motivated to do
the right thing is another. Giving entirely separate motivational stories about different moral 
obligations is uncomfortably disunified, and in any case, Lewis is likely to find the motivation to 
obey moral requirements somewhere in our desires, for two reasons. One is his general belief-
desire psychology for human action (his "Humeanism" about motivation). Another is his 
argument that a range of anti-Humean suggestions about moral motivation in particular face fatal
objections: his "triviality results" for "Desire as Belief" theses. (Lewis 1988a and 1996a). So a 
Lewisian should not be setting up duties or virtues as things that have a motivational grip on us 
except via a connection to our desires.
The moves available to Lewis in section 4 do not immediately help here: even if our desires 
could be explained by our responding to facts about obligations or facts about virtues, that would
not go very far to explain where these non-evaluative aspects of the world come from, and how 
they can be otherwise captured in naturalistically respectable terms. 
Space precludes further speculation about how a resolutely anti-consequentialist Lewisian might 
try to find a naturalistic place for moral phenomena that are not to be explained in terms of moral
values. As well as providing a naturalistically acceptable account of actions flowing from 
virtues; duties and obligations, together with a motivational story about all of these, such an 
account would need to explain how a morally good person is to balance these considerations in 
action. Lewis declined to offer an account even of balancing values in Lewis 1989, though he did
think that some moral considerations could sometimes outweigh others (see e.g. Lewis 1984 p 
214). This story might yield a lot of incommensurability and perhaps even dilemmas, if pursued 
in an entirely Lewisian spirit. The resulting story might not be as systematic as many extant 
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proposals, but the tenor of Lewis's moral remarks suggests that he would have seen this 
messiness as true to our "common sense morality" and our natural moral opinions, rather than 
something to be swept away by philosophical theory-building.
6. New Evidence About Lewis's Own View
Above I suggested that adopting agent-relative consequentialism is one way out some of these 
tensions for Lewis. We can recast some of his objections to consequentialism as only objections 
to agent neutral consequentialism, and then reconstruct his view as placing value in the centre of
the story both of a theory of action for moral agents, and his subjectivist story about the moral 
truth. There are more thorough-going anti-consequentialist options too, explaining rational action
partly in terms of moral phenomena not to be explained in terms of moral values, and treating 
Lewis's meta-ethical picture of values as only part of the needed naturalistic picture of ethics.
While Lewis has at least these two options open given his published work, we can make some 
interpretive progress by looking two letters David Lewis wrote to Philip Pettit in 1991 about 
consequentialism and non-consequentialism, published as letters 707 and 708 in Beebee and 
Fisher 2020 (pp 494–498). The best way of interpreting Lewis here seems to me that he was, 
after all, an agent-relative consequentialist, though it is hard to be sure. Lewis is responding to a 
verbal discussion with Pettit, a letter from Pettit, and an offprint Pettit sent him as well. The 
offprint was of Pettit 1991 (Beebee and Fisher 2020 p 497 ftnt 1).
Lewis's letters related to Pettit's honouring/promoting distinction for treating moral values, a 
distinction Pettit took to characterise the difference between consequentialist and deontological 
approaches to values. Pettit claims that both consequentialists and deontologists have an 
important place for moral values in their systems. The difference, as Pettit sees it, turns on how 
the two approaches treat the moral values they hold dear. Pettit draws a distinction between 
promoting a value and honoring that value. Promoting a value is familiar: to promote a value X 
is to bring about outcomes that score more highly on the ranking function associated with X. 
(Promoting happiness is bringing about more happiness overall.) Honoring a value is different. 
While I wish to focus on Lewis's rival to Pettit's distinction, Pettit himself holds there are a 
variety of attitudes we can take to values besides promoting them: we may seek to exemplify 
17
them ourselves with relatively little attention to whether others do so; we may try to keep clean 
hands with respect to them (e.g. honouring loyalty by not engaging in betrayal, whatever the 
overall consequences for loyalty in the world); or we may even act in ways that are not 
consciously sensitive to the value, though we may be evaluated positively by that standard by 
others. (One way to be loving is to not care about love per se, but rather to care about the 
beloved.) See Pettit 1989 p 119–120, Pettit 1991 p 19. 
Lewis points out that there is no agreed definition of consequentialism vs deontology, so 
attempts to characterise the distinction should not be to "capture a pre-existing sharp distinction",
but rather the objective should be to "put a finger on one of the differences" between prototypical
consequentialists and proto-typical deontologists. (Beebee and Fischer 2020 p 495). That said, he
offers three characterisations of approaches to values that together cover the ground that Pettit's 
distinction is intended to cover. The first is "pursuing a value by trying to instantiate it, where V 
is a value you can instantiate, namely a value de se" (p 497). That is, for paradigm cases, trying 
to ensure that you yourself have the property, or have it to a high degree. Valuing courage in this 
way is connected to desiring that oneself be courageous, valuing being a good friend in this way 
is valuing oneself being a good friend, and so on. In typical cases, this is similar to the first way 
Pettit talks of honoring a value. Lewis goes on to call this "pursuing" a value, presumably 
because of the connotation of pursuing it for oneself rather than "promoting", which sounds more
general.
The second way, "promoting" a value, comes in two varieties. (2A) is promoting V by trying to 
make it widely instantiated in one's world. This is equivalent, for Lewis, to trying to ensure one 
is an inhabitant of a world where V is widely instantiated, since Lewis thinks we can construe 
every desire as a desire de se. (See Lewis 1979 and Nolan 2006.) (2B) is to promote U (sic) by 
trying to ensure one's world instantiates U, or instantiates it to a high degree. Again this is 
equivalent, according to Lewis, to a certain kind of desire de se, the desire that one lives in a 
world that has U. What is distinctive about both of these desires is that they can be characterised 
to be "agent-neutral": we can find a property that everything in a world shares that is being 
pursued by each person in that world who has that value. (If I value a maximum feasible balance 
of pleasure over pain in my world, then all my worldmates with the same value are pursuing the 
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same goal, the maximising of pleasure over pain. While if I value courage in the sense of the 
previous paragraph, and you do too, then I am trying to ensure I am courageous and you are 
trying to ensure you are courageous.) 2A and 2B are varieties of promotion of value, in Pettit's 
sense, even though they also be characterised, according to Lewis, in terms of desire de se. The 
important difference is the kind of property that is being desired de se.
Lewis distinguishes a third approach to valuing a property: "'honouring' a value by trying to have
clean hands with respect to it", probably in response to Pettit treating it as an alternative to 
Lewis's (1) and (2A and 2B). Lewis wants to assimilate this to versions of the options he has 
already considered: "having clean hands with respect to a value V" is just another value, and one 
we can pursue (option 1) or promote (options 2A and 2B) (Beebee and Fisher 2020 p 498).
Lewis's discussion in these two letters suggests that he thinks these approaches to moral values 
cover the options, or at least the plausible options. And he suggests that the main relevant 
distinction for taxonomy is the one between his option (1) and his option (2), since we should 
assimilate option 3 to one or the other, depending on its flavour. So it is reasonable to infer that if
Lewis saw himself as rejecting consequentialist approaches, he should reject the view that 
morality is centrally about promoting agent-neutral values, which is what consequentialist-style 
theories enjoin in Lewis's taxonomy. Instead, Lewis must be thinking that plausible non-
consequentialist approaches give a central role to "pursuit" of values in Lewis's sense: seeking to 
instantiate properties oneself that are not automatically shared with all of ones worldmates.4
If this is right, then Lewis is in effect endorsing the view that anti-consequentialists, like himself,
are adopting agent relative moral values, and are pursuing more rather than less of them. On this 
reading of Lewis's response to Pettit, then, Lewis is more-or-less an agent-relative 
consequentialist after all, albeit one who makes some place for agent-neutral values; and one 
who wishes to at least leave open the possibility of incommensurable values and genuine moral 
dilemmas (p 495). Lewis's rejection of "consequentialism" in other places must then be centered 
on the agent neutrality of what Lewis took to be the position of the "consequentialist". And we 
4 These properties need not be intrinsic properties: the property of having keeping one's promises typically involves 
others who are the recipients of those promises, and the property of having loving relationships with one's family 
members is typically a relational property involving one's family, to give just two examples.
19
should not forget that this agent-neutrality can revolt the sensibilities of a moral theorist, 
especially for some kinds of apparently moral value. If you value loyalty as an underived moral 
value, for example, the suggestion that one might betray all of one's own loyalties to ensure 
people on the other side of the world are more steadfast in their loyalties, loyalties which you do 
not share, may seem not just monstrous but absurd. If you morally value your relationships to 
your family, cutting all your family ties so that unrelated people a hundred years hence can have 
slightly closer ties with their families is likely to seem repellant: and if you are willing to disrupt 
your family at the drop of a hat to promote better family relationships for strangers, your own 
family might reasonably doubt whether they meant much to you in the first place.
One reason to be cautious in drawing the conclusion that, after all, Lewis was an agent-relative 
consequentialist in anti-consequentialist clothing, is that in his discussion with Pettit Lewis is 
concerned to draw a distinction he puts in terms of the "consequentialist" and the "deontologist". 
In places like Lewis 1986 pp 127, above, he appears to contrast his own preferred views with 
views that give pride of place to "rules, rights and duties". While he does not use the expressions 
"virtue theory" and "deontology" in the 1986 passage, it strongly suggests he prefers an approach
more like a virtue-theoretic one to a deontological one. I am interpreting Lewis's distinction in 
his response, in effect, as capturing what he thinks of as a distinction between archetypal kinds of
consequentialist and archetypal kinds of anti-consequentialists, which is also what Pettit is trying
to characterise with the honouring/promoting distinction. But one might worry that Lewis 
thought archetypal virtue theorists required some third characterisation, and were characterised 
neither as neither pursuing agent-neutral moral values nor pursuing agent-relative moral values. 
In his letters to Pettit he does not suggest a third characterisation, which makes me think that in 
this context at least the "deontologist" contrasted with the "consequentialist" is supposed to be 
characterised broadly enough to cover the range of standard anti-consequentialist positions. 
Another piece of evidence for this reading is that in the letters to Pettit Lewis identifies G.E.M. 
Anscombe as the prototypical deontologist, while many read her as being closer to a virtue 
ethicist. (For the interpretive controversy about Anscombe, see Driver 2018 section 5.1.) So 
there is some evidence Lewis was thinking of a contrast between consequentialists and anti-
consequentialists more generally, rather than characterising "deontologists" in a narrow sense. 
However, without more textual information this reading could be disputed.
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Even with this reason for caution in mind, I think the best way to interpret Lewis in light of the 
letters to Pettit is as an agent-relative consequentialist, albeit one that is suspicious of smooth 
aggregation across values and open to the existence of moral dilemmas where no option is 
morally permitted. It makes natural sense of Lewis's conception of us as both (imperfectly) 
rational agents and as moral agents: insofar as we are rational we seek to maximise utility of a 
certain sort, it is just that the moral agent's utility function does not rank outcomes too differently
from her aggregated values, both "impersonal" values for the world and for agent-relative values 
for her. It makes sense of the centrality of value to Lewis's metaethical story: once we determine 
what the moral values are for an agent, behaving well is doing well enough in choosing options 
scored by those values out of the agent's available options. The job of Lewis's naturalised 
metaethics would be finished once it explained moral values in descriptive terms, since the 
values, agent-relative and agent-neutral, could be the fundamental moral truths through which we
explain other moral phenomena. It also makes sense of the scattered positive remarks about what
Lewis takes to be morally important: loyalty, solidarity, friendship, honour, integrity, avoiding 
being the cause of evil, etc. These are the sorts of values naturally modelled as agent-relative, 
though Lewis also seems to give some role to agent-neutral values, such as valuing the lives and 
happiness even of strangers (albeit perhaps only the strangers who inhabit our possible world).   
It does leave an interpretive puzzle: why would Lewis say, e.g. that consequentialism is "all 
wrong as everyday ethics" if he is a consequentialist with a few tweaks? And why would he 
suggest that doing the most we can for those most in need is not even permissible, if it comes at 
sufficient cost to ourselves and our integrity (Lewis 1996b p 154–155)?  Part of the explanation 
may be that he is thinking of consequentialism (in his sense) as recognising only agent-neutral 
values, while Lewis holds that in everyday moral matters is it agent-relative values that ought to 
dominate. (We might be maximising expected value when we decline to steal from our first-
world friend to send more money to Oxfam, if it is a case of the agent-relative values of 
friendship and integrity outweighing the agent-neutral value of relieving famine.) Part of the 
explanation may be that that the archetypal consequentialist embraces only a few fundamental 
values: happiness, the absence of suffering, desire satisfaction, etc., and even if Lewis is an 
agent-relative consequentialist, he is a pluralist who emphasises goods not on those lists. Partly it
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may be that Lewis thinks there is much more incommensurability of value and conflicts of 
fundamental values than an archetypal consequentialist might. A final possibility is that Lewis's 
commitment to an abstract moral theory was less constant than his clear-minded commitments in
many other areas of philosophy: perhaps his rejection of standard consequentialism sometimes 
manifested in his beliefs as a variety of agent-relative consequentialism, and sometimes 
manifested as an attitude incompatible with consequentialism even in this broad sense.
7. Conclusion
While there is a natural affinity for a decision-theoretic account of rational decisions with a 
consequentialist approach to ethics, having one if you have the other is far from compulsory. The
moral agent can still be rational by the lights of orthodox decision theory (or its causal-decision-
theory counterpart) if she desires to do the right thing, or exemplify virtue, as well as desiring 
outcomes that are directly morally valuable. Nevertheless, the story is cleaner if the moral agent 
only needs to do well in bringing about morally valuable outcomes, whether morally valuable in 
an agent-neutral or agent-relative way. (Or needs to attempt to do well, if expected value is what 
is important.)
I have also argued that there is an affinity between the kind of subjectivist account of moral 
values that Lewis endorsed, on the one hand, and consequentialism, on the other. Holding back 
from bringing about the outcomes we most morally value, for apparently moral reasons, is hard 
to understand. What makes sense to do given our moral motivations is naturally understood as 
maximising with respect to moral value, insofar as we can; or at least to prefer the morally better 
to the morally worse. Lewis's subjectivism, as stated, leaves little obvious room for deontology 
or virtue ethics (or at least for a virtue ethics that goes beyond adding to our basket of moral 
goods some moral goods concerning our own characters).
As far as I can see, Lewis would have had an intelligible and in some ways attractive set of moral
commitments if he had adopted a broadly consequentialist theory, albeit one with room for 
agent-relative value and genuine moral dilemmas. Given the evidence of his letters to Pettit, 
perhaps that was in fact his view. While Lewis does not seem to have aimed for a systematic set 
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of moral doctrines, I have tried to bring out puzzle about why his published views appeared 
feature a central internal tension: motivational and metaethical stories that naturally suggest 
consequentialism, with frequent rejections of consequentialism when discussing moral issues 
themselves. The puzzle is in part historical: what did he think the best resolution was, and if he 
was, in effect, an agent relative consequentialist, why does that come through so unclearly in his 
published work? It is in part philosophical: what is the best way for someone sympathetic to 
Lewis's starting points to develop an anti-consequentialist theory, whether or not this coheres 
with Lewis's preferred reconciliation?
Lewis's partial and scattered commitments, at least in his published writings, offer a challenge to 
the intellectual biographer trying to work out what Lewis thought, as well as the ethicist 
interested in whether there is a distinctive and interesting theory to be developed here. But I 
think the attempt to synthesise something general to say from scattered and sometimes 
apparently conflicting commitments is the task that many of us face when trying to work out the 
truth in ethics, either as a philosophical project or just to guide our own decisions and behaviour. 
Even if the best we can do for Lewis is a patchwork theory, with different kinds of 
considerations that do not nicely reduce to each other, and which may often give no verdict about
an action or too many, then at least it can be said for such a patchwork that it resembles the 
implicit moral commitments many of us operate with, whatever we say in our philosophical 
moments.5
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